

RESTRICTED

REPORT
OF
THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER

**ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION
OF THE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE CORPS
IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF
OPERATIONS**

19462

ARMY Declass/Release Instructions On File

G-2 SECTION

64

STUDY NUMBER 13

RESTRICTED

REPORT

OF

THE GENERAL BOARD

United States Forces, European Theater

Organization and Operation of the
Counter Intelligence Corps
In The European Theater of Operations

Study Number 13

THE GENERAL BOARD

United States Forces, European Theater

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

MISSION: Prepare a Report and Recommendation on the Organization and Operation of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the European Theater of Operations.

The General Board was established by General Orders 128, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, US Army, dated 17 June 1945, as amended by General Orders 182, dated 7 August 1945, and General Orders 312, dated 20 November 1945, Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater, to prepare a factual analysis of the strategy, tactics, and administration employed by the United States Forces in the European Theater.

File: E 320.2/31

Study Number 13.

THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
APO 408

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Prepared By:

Colonel Robert A. Schow, 12180, GSC.....Chief, G-2 Section
Colonel John H. Claybrook, 015817, GSC.....G-2 Section
Lt Col John H. Montgomery Jr., 020754, GSC..G-2 Section
Lt Col Howard B. St Clair, 022017, Inf.....G-2 Section
Lt Col Joseph K. Carson, Jr., 0159101, CE...G-5 Section
Lt Col James A. Lewis, 010892, Inf.....G-4 Section
Lt Col John L. Donovan, 0506212, CMP.....G-5 Section
Major Arnold N. Davis, 0335510, JAGD,Judge Advocate Section
Major LeRoy C. Hill, 0375943, Cav.....G-2 Section
Capt Thomas E. Cassidy, 01302599, Inf.....G-2 Section
1st Lt John S. D. Eisenhower, 026607, Inf...G-2 Section

Principal Consultants:

Colonel Thomas J. Sands, 017521, GSC, Chief, Counter Intelligence
Branch, United States Forces, European
Theater.
Lt Col Howard E. Wilson, 0319996, GSC, Commanding Officer, 970
Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment,
United States Forces, European Theater.
Lt Col Richard D. Stevens, 0192300, GSC, Chief, Counter Intelli-
gence Branch, Advance Section, Communi-
cations Zone.
Lt Col Alfred M. Osgood, 0350678, Inf, Chief, Counter Intelligence
Branch, First Allied Airborne Army.
Major Robert H. Doyle, 0477074, MI, Counter Intelligence Corps,
Headquarters, European Theater of Opera-
tions, United States Forces.
Major Leon L. Lemet, 0248726, Cav, Commanding Officer, 608 Coun-
ter Intelligence Corps Detachment, United
States Air Forces in Europe.
Capt Harold F. Dreshler, 01796054, CMP, Headquarters, 970 Counter
Intelligence Corps Detachment.
Capt Kenneth E. Hardin, 01317786, Inf, Counter Intelligence
Corps, 12th Army Group.
1st Lt James H. Ratliff, Jr., 02001145, Inf, Counter Intelligence
Corps, 12th Army Group.
2d Lt Maurice W. Volkowir, 02026799, MI, Counter Intelligence
Corps, 12th Army Group.
2d Lt William F. Plankenhorn, 0873458, AC, 315 Counter Intelligence
Corps Detachment.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Chapter 1: Organization and Administration	1
Chapter 2: Training	6
Chapter 3: Operations	9
Section 1 - General	9
Section 2 - Operations at the Level of the Division.	13
Section 3 - Operations in the Corps, Army and Army Group.	17
Section 4 - Operations in the Communications Zone.	18
Section 5 - Operations with the Air Forces. .	19
Section 6 - Co-ordination between Counter Intelligence Corps and Other Military Agencies	20
Chapter 4: Conclusions and Recommendations	22
Section 7 - Conclusions	22
Section 8 - Recommendations	22
Bibliography.	24
<u>Appendices:</u>	
Appendix 1 - Composition of 970 Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment	27
Appendix 2 - Additional Equipment Requested from the Field.	28
Appendix 3 - Letter and Questionnaire, The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater.	29
Appendix 4 - Letter and Questionnaire, The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater.	33
Appendix 5 - Letter, Headquarters, 12 Army Group, Subject: Counter Intelligence Corps	37

THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
APO 408

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 1

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

1. Development of the Counter Intelligence Corps. The first American troops to land in the European Theater of Operations included a small force of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel.¹ By November, 1943, detachments were on duty with all echelons of command having a general staff, and by D-Day, 1,053 officers and agents were in the European Theater. These personnel were assigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps, Military Intelligence Service, G-2 Division, War Department, and were attached to Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, United States Army. Further attachment was made to units down to and including divisions, with the unit G-2 exercising supervisory control usually through the commander of the detachment. When the Military Intelligence Service of the Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, United States Army was activated, the Counter Intelligence Corps became part of it administratively. In March, 1944, the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, was given both administrative and operational responsibility for the Counter Intelligence Corps in the European Theater of Operations.² Elements of the Counter Intelligence Corps were then organized into detachments in all echelons of command having general staffs. Even the Counter Intelligence Corps group on duty with Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, was organized into such a detachment and its commanding officer was designated Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, European Theater of Operations, United States Army. All orders attaching detachments to combat units or Communications Zone sections were issued by Headquarters, European Theater of Operations. Each detachment was then under the operational control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of the unit to which attached, and under administrative control of that unit for rations, quarters, and supplies.

2. Prior to receipt of the new table of organization and equipment, it was decided in the European Theater of Operations that the minimum amount of personnel needed in combat echelons for the proper discharge of Counter Intelligence Corps responsibilities would be a detachment of two officers and 12 enlisted men for each division, corps, and army, plus a reserve pool of six such detachments held at each army group for each army in the group. In the Communications Zone, there were two types of Counter Intelligence Corps detachments--interior detachments of one officer and 10 enlisted men, and port detachments of two officers and 16 enlisted men.³

3. Table of Organization and Equipment. Table of Organization and Equipment 30-500, published 24 January 1944, authorized the formation of detachments composed of a number of teams or cells, varying in size and composition.⁴ 'A' cells were intended to be administrative and the 'B' cells operational, with a combination of the two forming a detachment.⁵ For the occupational phase, a reorganization of the Counter Intelligence Corps was planned to provide the United States Army of Occupation with a centrally controlled investigative agency, capable of functioning with the efficiency of a national police force and having

the advantages of central records and direct communications.⁶ The planned reorganization required a reduction of personnel on duty with combat units, and in the Communications Zone outside Germany. The headquarters established on 10 May 1945, for the occupational phase, was designated as the 970 Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment.⁷ (See Appendix 1.)

4. Personnel. Most members of the Counter Intelligence Corps who served in the European Theater of Operations were selected according to rigid standards and assigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps in the United States. The principal deficiency in their qualifications was the lack of background in languages.⁸ Despite efforts to insure that training in German would be a portion of all replacements' qualifications, as late as January, 1945, only 26.9 percent of the Corps' members could be classified as having a working knowledge of the German language. General qualifications for admission into the Counter Intelligence Corps were formulated as follows by the War Department on 19 September 1944:¹⁰

a. Officers:

- (1) 25 to 38 years of age, inclusive, at the time of entrance into the Corps.
- (2) Physically fit for full field duty overseas.
- (3) College degree, or broad experience in the Counter Intelligence Corps as an officer or enlisted man.
- (4) Fluency in one or more foreign language desirable, and possibly required.
- (5) Character, discretion, integrity, and loyalty to the United States.
- (6) United States citizenship.
- (7) Previous military experience in the field.

b. Enlisted Men:

- (1) 24 to 38 years of age, inclusive, at the time of entrance into the Corps.
- (2) Physically fit for full field duty overseas.
- (3) Army General Classification Test Score of at least 110.
- (4) College degree, or high school graduate with linguistic ability, and/or special qualifications in investigative work.
- (5) Fluency in one or more foreign language desirable, and possibly required.
- (6) United States citizenship.
- (7) Character, discretion, integrity, and loyalty to the United States.

Most of the personnel arrived in the European Theater of Operations organized into detachments, and fully equipped for their mission. These

detachments and casualties reported to Headquarters, Counter Intelligence Corps, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, and were attached to tactical units after a short orientation course to acquaint them with their work in the European Theater of Operations. Attachment to tactical units took place promptly because of the urgent need for Counter Intelligence Corps men at all levels.

5. Distinction between Officers and Enlisted Men. The total strength of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the European Theater of Operations as of 1 March 1945, was 508 officers and 1,526 enlisted men.¹¹ In operational work, the distinction between officers and enlisted men disappeared in many instances. For example, the uniform frequently worn by both officers and enlisted men was a plain American uniform, with the officer type 'US' insignia on the collar tabs and cap. Officers and men generally were on the same plane for billets, messing, transport, and general freedom of movement. Also, inasmuch as both officers and enlisted men of the Counter Intelligence Corps were selected under practically the same qualifications, and were expected to exercise a high degree of initiative, and to assume much responsibility. The distinction between officers and enlisted men was felt by some Counter Intelligence Corps personnel to be a handicap. Accordingly, the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Corps, European Theater of Operations, recommended in May, 1945, that all agents of the Corps be commissioned officers, for the following reasons:¹²

"a. Counter Intelligence Corps agents in the course of their normal duties come into daily contact with high-ranking officers of both the American and foreign armies, high civil officials and other authorities.

b. Counter Intelligence Corps agents serve as highly trained and specialized technical advisers on matters of security, control of civilians, arrests of important personages, etc., and make recommendations which are often the sole basis for the dismissal of civil authorities in occupied towns and the appointment of civic leaders for the reconstitution of government.

c. The qualifications for Counter Intelligence Corps agents are at least equal to those required of commissioned personnel."

6. 'Special Agents' and 'Agents.' In the early stages of the organization of the Counter Intelligence Corps, a differentiation was made between 'Special Agents' and 'Agents.' A 'Special Agent' was either a commissioned officer or a noncommissioned officer of one of the first three grades, distinguished from an 'Agent' by special credentials, and having authority through being appointed Agent-in-Charge of field offices. The distinction was of little importance in the European Theater of Operations, however, since the title of 'Special Agent' was conferred automatically upon attaining the grade of staff sergeant. Both 'Special Agents' and 'Agents' carried European Theater of Operations identification cards; Military Intelligence badges; foreign language inserts identifying them in French, German, Dutch, and Danish as members of the Counter Intelligence Corps; and the blue pass of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.¹³

7. Uniform. While in the Zone of the Interior, it was common practice for the members of the Counter Intelligence Corps to wear civilian clothing. This authorization continued in effect in the European Theater of Operations, but generally was not used.¹⁴ Many Counter Intelligence Corps members in the European Theater of Operations wore the uniform authorized for civilians serving with the armed forces; although this was not specifically authorized. Regulations in

the European Theater of Operations stated that decisions as to the kind of clothing to be worn by members of the Counter Intelligence Corps were a command responsibility.¹⁵ 12 Army Group authorized the wearing of the civilian uniform in liberated territory, but in conquered territory agents were authorized to wear the civilian uniform only when actually engaged in interrogation duties at interrogation centers or similar installations.¹⁶

8. Exemption from Certain Regulations. In order to facilitate their work, members of the Counter Intelligence Corps were exempted from certain local military regulations and restrictions. One directive for the European Theater of Operations states:¹⁷

"Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will be encouraged to exercise initiative to the fullest extent, and, in the performance of their duties, they will be permitted to operate with minimum restriction of movement. When consistent with the policy of the appropriate commander, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will not be delayed in the execution of their assigned duties by the observation of the standard military customs or prohibitions, nor by the Military Police or other military agencies. Counter Intelligence Corps badges and credentials will be honored at all times."

Another directive designed to prevent the misuse of counter intelligence specialists stated:¹⁸

"Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will be employed only on tasks involving a counter intelligence interest. They will not be employed on combat intelligence missions, routine Prisoner-of-War interrogations, black market investigations, criminal investigations, investigation of cases involving only moral turpitude, irregularities not concerned with subversion, counter intelligence, sedition and similar matters, nor other work which is properly the function of another agency and which may retard or interfere with the performance of intelligence duties. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will not be assigned to kitchen police, fatigue, guard, or other duties of a comparable nature."

Some instances were noted of misuse of personnel, but in general the Corps was given broad freedom of action, and independence of operation.

9. Administration. Because of the decentralized structure of the Counter Intelligence Corps, there were many individuals and agencies who had some degree of authority over it. The War Department's authority consisted of the exercise of broad supervision over the training and policies of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the Zone of the Interior, the determination of tables of organization and equipment, and the transfer of personnel into the Counter Intelligence Corps. The War Department maintained central files of the personnel of the Counter Intelligence Corps, and of credentials and badges. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, had full control over the training and operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the European Theater of Operations. The administrative functions involved were delegated to the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, and the Military Intelligence Service of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, United States Army. The most important element of authority of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, European Theater of Operations, was his power to transfer individuals into, within, and out of the Counter Intelligence Corps, and the deployment of the personnel and the detachments. He also supervised the training of personnel and had responsibilities

in the long range planning for the Counter Intelligence Corps in the European Theater. Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, prepared, published, and distributed orders concerning personnel of the Counter Intelligence Corps. The G-2 of the various combat units, and echelons of Communications Zone, had full authority over the operations of the detachments, attached to their respective headquarters.

10. Supply and Equipment. Besides the issue of items common to all soldiers, members of the Counter Intelligence Corps were allotted special equipment considered necessary for the performance of their duties. Special investigative items such as fingerprint materials and elaborate listening and recording devices were found to be superfluous. On the other hand, certain items were indispensable, such as the .38 caliber revolver, handcuffs, and cameras. Detachments working in the field suggested that more equipment was needed, beyond the table of equipment authorization. Such items included electric generators, field telephones, portable radios and more and larger Coleman stoves. (See Appendix 2.) In general, the vehicular allowances were felt to be adequate. Normally, detachments were issued all authorized investigative equipment by Counter Intelligence Corps supply depots in the Zone of the Interior, while the remainder of the organizational equipment was issued, on a detachment basis, after detachments were attached to units in the European Theater of Operations. Property was accounted for according to normal Army regulations.¹⁹

11. Confidential Funds. Confidential funds were made available to the Counter Intelligence Corps, for the payment of informants and for certain other expenditures.²⁰ These funds were allotted to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of the unit to which the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment was attached, and were accounted for through a voucher system. When it was found that cash payments to informants were not nearly as effective as commodities (cigarettes, gasoline, food, soap, candy), efforts were made, without success, to secure an issue of these items.

CHAPTER 2TRAINING OF COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS PERSONNEL12. Training in the Zone of the Interior.

a. Basic Military Training. Initial War Department plans provided that all enlisted men of the Counter Intelligence Corps receive basic training in one of the major arms or services of the Army of the United States. In the early stages of organization, however, the immediate need for agents was so great that some men missed this training entirely while others received only such basic training as was available in special Military Intelligence Training Centers. These centers served only small groups of candidates for the Counter Intelligence Corps, and lacked the facilities for carrying on thorough basic military training. The slighting of basic military training, and the fact that most agents of the Counter Intelligence Corps worked in civilian clothes, tended to obscure the fact that the agents were in the Army. The result of this lack of sufficient basic training was that a large number of personnel were unable to care for themselves properly in the field under combat conditions.

b. Results of Training in the Zone of Interior. The program of training in the Zone of Interior totalled about 25 weeks of military training, preliminary and advanced investigators' schools, staging area training, and practical experience. The following are the general criticisms of the insufficiency of this training as experienced by intelligence officers in the European Theater of Operations:

- (1) Too much time was used in investigative training, with emphasis on detection of ordinary crime.
- (2) The training was not sufficiently military in character. It did not force the agent to think of himself as a soldier and to realize that physical hardening and knowledge of field conditions might mean the difference between life and death.
- (3) The training failed to prepare the personnel of the Counter Intelligence Corps for work overseas. It imparted only a slight understanding of what counter-intelligence work was to be under combat conditions.

c. New training program instituted, June, 1944. In order to train²¹ Counter Intelligence Corps personnel better for operations in combat, the War Department, in June, 1944, prescribed a new course of training to be taken by all enlisted personnel of the Counter Intelligence Corps.²² This training program was of 29 weeks duration and consisted of basic military training (17 weeks); security intelligence school (4 weeks); and a general intelligence course (8 weeks). Personnel scheduled for attachment to the Air Forces were required to take eight additional weeks of training in aircraft servicing. Unfortunately, this new training program was instituted too late to produce positive results.

13. Training in the European Theater of Operations.

a. Training in the United Kingdom. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel stationed in the United Kingdom awaiting the invasion of the European Continent concerned themselves principally with internal security. Defects in the previous training in the Zone of Interior were recognized, but because of the lack of sufficient time, additional training

was necessarily a part-time affair and did not reach all the personnel. In order to correct defects in basic military training, the Counter Intelligence Corps detachments with combat units participated in the field exercises of their commands by simulating the types of problems which they expected to encounter in combat. A limited number of personnel of base sections participated in various British combat courses. A one month infantry course, designed for the Counter Intelligence Corps, was given to 180 men at the American School Center. In order to overcome the deficiencies in language training, a series of classes in French and German were instituted in September, 1943, at Headquarters, Counter Intelligence Corps, European Theater of Operations. In addition, foreign language was included in the training program of most detachments.

b. Special orientation for mission on the European continent. The principal object of the training in the United Kingdom was to teach the mission and the anticipated methods of operation of the Counter Intelligence Corps on the European Continent. To this end, a monthly orientation course was instituted on 1 August 1943, at Headquarters, Counter Intelligence Corps, European Theater of Operations. For the same purpose a limited number of members of the Counter Intelligence Corps attended the British Intelligence School. Headquarters, Counter Intelligence Corps, also prepared for distribution to all detachments a Counter Intelligence Corps Handbook on Europe. This publication contained geographical, economic, social, and political information on France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Germany as well as information on international law, and the laws of military occupation. Headquarters, Counter Intelligence Corps, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, maintained a steady flow of training bulletins and memoranda, designed to give a background knowledge to all Counter Intelligence Corps personnel of conditions which would be encountered on the European Continent, and a summation of the experience in action of the Counter Intelligence Corps to date. Some of the titles selected from this literature indicate the scope:

- (1) French Political Parties under Vichy.
- (2) An Estimate of the Counter-Intelligence Situation in France.
- (3) The French Underground Movement and German Counter-Measures to Control it.
- (4) De Gaulle and the Fighting French.
- (5) German Military Administration in France.
- (6) The Tactical Functions of the Counter Intelligence Corps.
- (7) The Tactical Experiences of the Counter Intelligence Corps in Iceland, North Africa, Sicily, and Italy.

c. Training on the Continent after D-Day. Operational requirements left little time or opportunity for a continuance of training after landing on the continent. Although training had been as practical as possible, all the counter-intelligence situations met had not been anticipated; therefore, much improvisation in methods of operation was necessary. The Office of the Chief of Counter Intelligence disseminated to all detachments in the European Theater lessons learned by various detachments in combat. This office also disseminated to all detachments through the medium of counter-intelligence bulletins, memoranda, and directives, that intelligence received from regular sources. Personnel continued the study of foreign languages, and many officers and men of

the Counter Intelligence Corps were aided in gaining a working knowledge of a foreign language by English-speaking civilians.

d. Training of new agents. The need for German-speaking personnel in the Counter Intelligence Corps required a recruiting campaign to obtain men from other branches of the service. Men who could speak German and who were qualified for membership in the Counter Intelligence Corps were transferred promptly. The situation did not permit an elaborate training program for these men. In general, they were assigned to detachments, where they received an informal course of training designed to give them a counter-intelligence background. They were instructed in the jurisdiction and methods of operation of the Counter Intelligence Corps; the organization of the German intelligence services, the Nazi party, and its satellite bodies; the personal identification papers of German citizens; and the fundamentals of military and civil security, and travel control.

CHAPTER 3

OPERATIONS OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS IN THE

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

SECTION 1

GENERAL

14. Mission: In accordance with a War Department letter, "The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the successful operations of the Army of the United States through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity and disaffection, and the detection and prevention of enemy espionage and sabotage." 23

15. Duties. In the execution of its mission, the Counter Intelligence Corps was instructed by the War Department to perform the following duties, pursuant to the general plan of the theater commander under whom it was operating.

"a. Primary Duty in Forward Combat Areas. The primary duty of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel is to secure counter-intelligence targets in the area of the objective. Foremost among these targets are:

- (1) Known and suspect enemy agents.
- (2) Known enemy collaborationists, sympathizers, and other persons whose presence menaces the security of the allied forces.
- (3) Offices formerly occupied by the enemy intelligence services or enemy police organizations and any documents they contain.
- (4) Offices of local semi-military organizations and collaborationist bodies and their records.
- (5) Centers of communications.
- (6) Buildings, billets, and installations known or suspected to contain documents of counter-intelligence value.

"b. Secondary Duties in Forward Combat Areas.

- (1) Making security checks in cooperation with the Military Police who are marshalling refugees and other civilians arriving from enemy occupied territory.
- (2) Contacting local authorities and persons known to be friendly to the allied cause in order to secure all possible counter-intelligence information.
- (3) Advising upon and assisting in securing against sabotage, all public and private installations, the continued operation of which is essential to the allied forces.
- (4) Checking upon the observance by civilian population

of all security provisions contained in the proclamations and orders issued by Civil Affairs detachments.

- (5) Assisting in the discovery and collection of any hidden armaments or equipment which have not been surrendered or reported in accordance with ordinances.
- (6) The seizure of civil communications and arranging for their protection against sabotage until taken over by authorized Signal Communications personnel as provided in operational orders. The records of such installations are of prime importance and should be secured, guarded, and turned over to the proper authorities.
- (7) Seizing and impounding all civilian and captured enemy mail.
- (8) Advising on the immediate establishment of guards at all captured ordnance and ammunition dumps, especially those which may be accessible to the local population.
- (9) Stopping publication of newspapers and other periodicals.
- (10) Taking measures necessary to prevent looting and destruction of enemy documents and materiel held by our own troops.
- (11) Transmitting to Civil Affairs, Provost Marshal, and Military Police personnel all information on matters within their purview, such as civilian controls, adequacy and extent of cooperation of civil police and the extent of disorder, looting, and sabotage.

"c. Investigative Duties. The Counter Intelligence Corps will be employed in investigation of:

- (1) Espionage.
- (2) Sabotage.
- (3) Subversive activity, including rumor mongering and surreptitious issue of enemy propaganda.
- (4) Disaffection, treason, and sedition within the United States Forces.
- (5) Violations of security regulations.
- (6) Personnel of governments of occupied territory who are retained in their official capacities. (In certain instances involving a counter-intelligence interest).
- (7) Certain civilian personnel to be employed by the United States Government.

"d. Miscellaneous Duties.

- (1) Cooperation with the Corps of Military Police and

other Military and civil authorities in exercising control at frontiers of territory under the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces of the United States. This action will include the recommending of the establishment and the assisting in the maintenance of controls and control systems over the entrance of persons, goods, and information into territory occupied by this command.

- (2) Assisting port counter-intelligence officers in the discharge of their duties.
- (3) Performance of security surveys to determine the safety of communications, transportation lines, storage and supply facilities, and other United States installations and offices.
- (4) Delivery of security lectures to the troops and other provisions for general indoctrination of all United States military personnel in security principles.
- (5) Surveillance of establishments frequented by United States military personnel, and located within or near the area occupied by United States troops to determine the security of military information therein.
- (6) Establishing informant networks outside the United States military establishment.
- (7) Keeping the G-2, A-2, or S-2, of the respective commands informed of internal politics, political parties, or subversive groups.

"e. Duties in the event of Evacuation or Withdrawal.

- (1) Searching evacuated headquarters, bivouac areas, supply depots, and other installations to insure that documents or any material that might be of intelligence value to the enemy have been completely destroyed or removed.
- (2) Checking the control of refugees along the routes used by troops to prevent the possibility of enemy infiltration."

16. Additional Duties for Operations in Germany. In the reformulation of the duties of the Counter Intelligence Corps for operations in Germany new responsibilities were added, as follows, according to the "Counter Intelligence Directive for Germany" published by 12 Army Group:²⁴

"a. The operational functions of personnel of the Counter Intelligence Corps and that personnel which operates under the supervision of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel are as follows:

- "1. To arrest any person who constitutes a threat to the security of the Allied armed forces, including leaders of the Nazi Party and affiliated organizations, as directed. . . .
5. To contact the civil authorities initially with Military Government if practicable.

6. To establish informant systems among local persons known to be friendly to the Allied cause in order to procure all possible information of counter-intelligence interest, particularly that information relating to underground Nazi or anti-Allied activity.
7. To locate and seize enemy sabotage equipment. It will be placed under guard until instructions for disposition thereof have been received from the G-2 of the appropriate Army/Military District, to whom a report will be made describing such equipment in detail.
8. To coordinate with Military Government in the discovery and collection of any hidden armament, radio transmitters or equipment which have not been surrendered or reported in accordance with Military Government proclamations, laws, ordinances, notices or orders.
10. To coordinate with Military Government the establishment of check points for travel security control and recommend to Military Government approval or disapproval of requests of applicants for travel permits.
12. To coordinate with Anti-Aircraft Artillery to secure information indicating the dropping of parachute agents.
14. To recommend to Military Government the removal of unreliable officials. Civil officials will be arrested by Counter Intelligence Corps without consulting Military Government only when immediate apprehension is necessary for security reasons.
16. To report all trends of civil dissension to the appropriate G-2, Counter Intelligence Branch."

17.. Operational Methods. The methods employed in the execution of the duties listed above varied in accordance with the situation facing the commands of the different echelons with which Counter Intelligence Corps detachments were operating. Some practices, however, as well as some difficulties were common to all echelons.

a. Detachments assigned to the Ground Forces were generally split into small sub-sections of two or three agents each, who were made responsible for the counter-intelligence coverage of an area within the jurisdiction of the command. Each sub-section acted as an independent unit, but its activities were coordinated by the detachment commander, who maintained his headquarters at or near the command post of the unit to which the detachment was attached.

b. An uninterrupted counter-intelligence coverage was contemplated through a relay system. The detachments of divisions turned their records over to the detachments of the corps, corps to army, and army to Communications Zone, as each echelon moved on. The final recipients of all records were the static detachments of the Base Sections. As the rear headquarters had a greater area to cover with a relatively smaller number of men, the relay system resulted in an increasingly larger territorial responsibility for the individual agent, a responsibility often far in excess of his physical capabilities. In a fast moving situation, forward commands were unable to maintain adequate records, or were unable to wait for a detachment to relieve them, which resulted

in considerable confusion and loss of effort. There were countless cases of individuals having been jailed by the detachments of divisions and corps without adequate case histories being placed in the hands of succeeding detachments. These detachments would then have to reinvestigate the prisoners in order to dispose of them. Another weakness of the relay system was that local authorities soon wearied of finding a new Counter Intelligence Corps detachment in the area every 10 or 20 days, and became confused by the changes in policy. Informants were reluctant to be passed from one agent to another because they sensed danger in becoming known as informants, and because, being called upon to repeat their entire story to a new counter-intelligence representative a few days later, they lost confidence that their information would lead to action.

c. In accordance with the policy of the United States government in permitting the return of the exiled governments, the bulk of counter-intelligence work in the liberated nations was turned over as rapidly as possible to resistance groups, military authorities, police, and law-enforcement officers of the new governments. These agencies were left to dispose of collaborators and to carry on the local functions of civil security under a system of spot checks by the Counter Intelligence Corps. These agencies in turn provided the Counter Intelligence Corps with information on persons who constituted a menace to the security of the Allied military effort. This plan of turning over much counter-intelligence work to local authorities could not be followed in conquered enemy territory. Some assistance was received, however, from security troops, such as the Military Government Police, the Security Guards, and the Frontier Guards. The personnel of these organizations were given orientation in the counter-intelligence mission, and they took over many of the routine duties of military and civil security. The Counter Intelligence Corps agents were thus left free for their primary missions of destroying the intelligence organizations of the enemy and the dissolution of the National Socialist Party.

18. Operational Problems.

a. Counter Intelligence Corps detachments of all echelons were handicapped by the lack of clerical and administrative personnel needed in preparing the large volume of paper work that is essential to any investigative body. This resulted in a loss of personnel as trained investigators had to assume clerical duties, and in slowing up the dissemination of information because agents were not, as a general rule, skilled typists or clerks. For the same reason, records were often kept in poor or fragmentary form during rapidly moving situations, when priority had to be given to active operations such as arrests, searches, and implementation of civil security controls.

b. The lack of qualified linguists in the Counter Intelligence Corps presented a continuing operational problem which was only partially overcome by the use of untrained civilian and Military Intelligence interpreters. Interrogation through an interpreter is at best of indifferent effectiveness, because of the rapid-fire follow-up, essential in breaking down a cover story, cannot be attained when the subject has time to compose himself while his replies are being translated to the interrogating agent.

SECTION 2

OPERATIONS AT THE LEVEL OF THE DIVISION

19. Mission of the Detachment of a Division. The Counter Intelligence Corps detachment of a division was in the position of being usually the first security personnel to enter territory recently cleared

of the enemy. Its role in counter-intelligence operations was of primary importance, because it laid the ground-work for all later security measures. Its mission was to secure the most obvious targets--the agents left behind by the enemy for espionage and sabotage, the best-known collaborators with the enemy, and key public buildings such as the seat of local government and the centers of communication. The prompt action of the detachment of a division could be of immeasurable value in the security of our forces, and could make available, in arrested suspects and seized documents, important sources of tactical intelligence. Detachments were briefed in advance as to the location of key targets, and were provided with "Black Lists" of persons to be arrested. In areas a little removed from actual combat, the detachment of a division had additional duties in the original screening of civilian refugees, in making the area as safe as possible for the presence of our troops, and in continuing the search for stay-behind agents, line-crossers, and leading collaborators.

20. Organization of the Detachment of a Division. The detachment of a division ordinarily consisted of two officers, a captain and a lieutenant, and from four to 18 agents. Invariably, the detachment was split up for operations into sub-sections. In the larger detachments, a fairly standard plan allowed for the two officers with one or more agents to maintain the command post of the detachment near the command post of the division, or in more static situations, in a nearby town. Two or three agents were attached to each regiment, or equivalent element of the command, where they worked in close coordination with the S-2. The deployment of the detachment in this manner created some small problems of communication among its different elements. The commanding officer of the detachment worked in close personal contact with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of the division, and it was ordinarily through the latter that the detachment maintained contact with the Counter Intelligence Corps in the next higher echelon. Personal contacts and lateral communication among detachments of adjacent divisions, and similar informal relations with the Corps Counter Intelligence detachments, were common in practice, but it was the duty of the detachment commander in each case to keep the G-2 fully informed as to the counter-intelligence developments.

21. Methods of Operation.

a. The Relay System. The detachment of a division moved forward with its division. The operational plan of the Counter Intelligence Corps called for a continuous counter-intelligence coverage of all areas, and for this reason it was the duty of the detachment before moving forward to turn over its prisoners, its records, and presumably its informants to the detachment of the Corps. To make this transition as smooth as possible, one or two agents of the detachment of the division stayed behind to familiarize the detachment of the Corps with the counter-intelligence situation in the area, or representatives of the detachment of the Corps came forward to receive such familiarization.

b. Internal Security. The detachment of a division served in an advisory capacity on matters relating to the internal security of the division. The safe-guarding of classified information was encouraged in security talks by members of the Counter Intelligence Corps, and enforced by undercover checks in headquarters and installations. Military personnel assigned to work involving the handling of secret information were investigated as to loyalty. Security surveys were made, which resulted in recommendations as to the organization of the interior guard and, in the field, as to the guarding of installations of military importance.

c. Military Security. The chief responsibilities of the

Counter Intelligence Corps with reference to military security were the prevention of sabotage and espionage, and the protection of the secrecy of troop movements.

- (1) As long as a combat division was in the Zone of the Interior or in the United Kingdom, the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment's problems of military security, were essentially the same as those of internal security, except as to troop movements. The Counter Intelligence Corps was responsible for preventing sabotage and espionage only in the immediate area occupied by the division, as external security measures were a responsibility of civil police of the United States or Great Britain. Thus, counter-sabotage and counter-espionage measures were in the main a question of the interior guard. The protection of the secrecy of troop movements could be done only by going outside the immediate area of the division.
- (2) Responsibilities of the Counter Intelligence Corps in connection with mounting airborne operations. In preparation for an airborne movement, one or two Counter Intelligence Corps agents were sent to each airfield concerned to advise the commanding officer on the control of the perimeter of the field, to control and re-route civilian traffic, to screen local residents and transients, and to check all establishments frequented by military personnel in the vicinity. The large number and wide dispersal of the airfields used in such operations increased the security problems beyond the capabilities of the detachment of a single division; therefore, additional personnel ordinarily was provided by Headquarters, First Allied Airborne Army, and by the Counter Intelligence Corps detachments of divisions not participating in the operations. Also, at times, the loan of additional personnel was obtained from the detachments of the Communications Zone.
- (3) Upon the arrival of a division in a combat area, the responsibilities of its Counter Intelligence Corps detachment with respect to military security became greater. Prevention of sabotage and espionage involved widespread control of the civilian population in the area under the jurisdiction of the division, exploiting local resistance groups for information on potential saboteurs and spies, setting up road blocks and traffic control points, and making raids and arrests.

d. Civil Security. The regulation of the civilian population for purposes of security was accomplished with great difficulty. The tactical situation frequently demanded speed and permitted only hasty control. Travel control was one of the chief methods of checking espionage and the movement of potential saboteurs. Road blocks and spot checks were the principal methods for controlling circulation. Road patrols by agents in one-quarter ton trucks were frequently sent out, particularly in areas which had been cleared recently. The identification of civilians was a major task; the agents had to be familiar with all types of identification documents, and to be able to judge quickly whether a traveler was or was not a threat to security. Confusion was inevitable, particularly in an armored thrust, when Military Government had not been able to institute its pass system. It was frequently the

agent's sole responsibility to judge on the basis of verbal, on-the-spot investigation the validity of a person's documents and story. In some instances, the detachments of divisions were responsible also for blackout security, which involved everything from accidental violations by civilians to alleged signal lights. The alertness of our troops to anything which seemed irregular kept agents on the run because investigation of all reports was necessary to insure keeping the confidence of the troops. Communication systems were put under control promptly upon entry into a town, though frequently towns were passed through or bypassed so rapidly that it was virtually impossible to insure any thorough control. Agents often supervised the collection of arms and conducted raids for hidden weapons. On many occasions, agents had to arrange for immediate screening and evacuation of civilians from the battle areas.

e. Techniques of Investigation. Immediately upon entry into a newly captured area, the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment sought out the most dangerous persons and arrested them. The "Black Lists" of suspects provided in advance proved to be of little value in the liberated territories. The Counter Intelligence Corps, in practice, usually identified its first targets by contacting local officials and leaders of the underground movements who informed on the local suspects. The suspect lists later furnished to detachments upon entry into Germany proved to be of greater value. Even so, the advance detachments exploited what aid they could get from local officials and informants. In Germany, burgermeisters proved to be helpful in rounding up suspects and routine arrests resulted sometimes from a burgermeister's order summoning all citizens falling within the automatic arrest categories to surrender themselves. Only in relatively static situations were division detachments able to make full and complete investigations of suspects.

22. Operational Problems.

a. Rapidity of Movement. Many of the difficulties encountered in operations by the detachments of divisions resulted from the rapidity of advance by combat troops. Much counter-intelligence work had to be done in a hasty manner when the seriousness of the matters involved dictated more time for investigation.

b. Confusion as to Status and Functions. At times there was some misunderstanding among combat troops as to the status and functions of the Counter Intelligence Corps. There was considerable misunderstanding in combat units as to what the Counter Intelligence Corps was supposed to do. In general, the detachments had to begin by educating the officers of the unit to which they were attached as to their capabilities and proper functions. At times, the members of Counter Intelligence Corps detachments in forward areas found that a considerable portion of their time was occupied by activities bearing no close relation to their true functions.

e. Coordination with Military Government. At division level, there was a close relationship between Civil Affairs (Military Government) and the Counter Intelligence Corps. Civil Affairs was heavily dependent upon the Counter Intelligence Corps agents for implementing the initial phase of civil security, and for such basic tasks as the collection of arms and security investigations. The interest in and insistence upon continued security checks by the Counter Intelligence Corps frequently met with opposition. In a fast-moving situation, Military Government could do little more than set up a tentative policy for the issuance of passes, and many times the variety of authorizations given out was bewildering. The public safety personnel of Military Government sometimes became their own Counter Intelligence Corps, and some intelligence officers are of the opinion that Counter Intelligence Corps per-

sonnel should be assigned to Military Government. In some cases, operations were hindered by a clash of interests and methods between Military Government and the Counter Intelligence Corps.

SECTION 3

OPERATIONS IN CORPS, ARMY, AND ARMY GROUP

23. Methods of Operation.

a. The Relay System. Upon being relieved, division and corps detachments normally turned over to the detachment of the next higher echelon their records and essential operational information about an area. In fast-moving situations, there was frequently a time lag between the abandoning of an area by one unit and the arrival of the succeeding unit, but the continuity of coverage was usually maintained. Targets, both persons and installations, which had been by-passed by the detachments of divisions, became the responsibility of the relieving agents, and insofar as possible, informant networks that had been established were worked into a system to cover the corps or army area.

b. Security Controls. Security operations in the areas of corps and armies were complicated by the return to their homes of large numbers of civilians who had evacuated the areas during the fighting. The identification and screening of these people for possible enemy agents was a time-consuming, but necessary, job. The detachments of corps and armies were able to establish more rigid civil security controls and to restrict the circulation of civilians throughout their area by using roving patrols, road blocks, and lines for checking personal identification papers. These measures resulted in the apprehension of many enemy agents who had passed the forward controls and agents who had been left behind as the enemy evacuated the area. The Counter Intelligence Corps detachments of corps and armies also devoted a considerable amount of their time to screening of civilians who applied for exemptions from the curfew and travel restrictions and to screening civilian officials or prospective appointees for Military Government.

c. Investigations. More thorough work in the investigation and arrest of persons falling within the automatic arrest and wanted categories could be done at corps and army levels than at division level. The corps and army normally operated counter-intelligence interrogation centers, where suspects sent back by divisions and those apprehended by the corps and army were interrogated in detail, evaluated, exploited, and disposed of by release or confinement. Upon the Counter Intelligence Corps detachments of corps and armies fell the bulk of the work in the collection and exploitation of documents which had been seized by the detachments of divisions. In exploiting documents, the Counter Intelligence Corps worked closely with the Civil Censorship Detachments and with the Document Teams of the Military Intelligence Service.

d. Lack of Sufficient Personnel. Counter Intelligence Corps detachments of corps and armies, like those of divisions, suffered from the limited number of personnel available for duty, and the limited number of linguists. Where the Counter Intelligence Corps in a division was hampered by a lack of time to organize and exploit information, it was handicapped in corps and armies by the over-extension of its personnel, which resulted in a lack of complete coverage of areas of responsibility.²⁵

24. Variations in Mission. The operational techniques of the Counter Intelligence Corps varied little among the different echelons. The chief difference arose from an increase or decrease of emphasis on certain phases of the counter-intelligence mission. The methods of in-

vestigating suspects at army level did not differ greatly from the methods used at division level except for the time involved. Ordinarily, the farther a unit was to the rear, the more time and facilities it had at its disposal to conduct investigations. On the other hand, the farther to the rear the detachment was located, the greater it was dispersed thereby requiring extensive travel to provide even sketchy coverage. In the areas of corps and armies, a greater concentration of supply and headquarters installations called for added emphasis on security at the expense of seeking out suspects and of carrying on counter-espionage activities. At the level of the army group, the Counter Intelligence Corps had no operational functions other than the security of the headquarters and certain advisory duties of a technical nature for subordinate commands.

25. Organization of Detachments. An army group had six reserve teams, which it placed at the disposal of the armies subordinate to it, and which in turn were used by armies to reinforce their corps. The detachment of either a corps or an army normally set up an administrative and headquarters security unit of three or four officers and agents at the command post, while the rest of the detachment was spread out to provide counter-intelligence coverage for the whole area. This personnel was augmented by Military Intelligence Interpreter personnel, and such additional Counter Intelligence Corps personnel as were attached from the next higher headquarters.

SECTION 4

OPERATIONS IN THE COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

26. Mission. The primary mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps in Communications Zone was to protect military installations and the lines of communications against sabotage. Detachments in Communications Zone had an advantage over those attached to tactical units in that they were relatively static and had more time to organize the counter-intelligence coverage of their areas. However, they were responsible for much larger areas than other Counter Intelligence Corps detachments of similar size. Approximately 50 per cent of the time of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the Communications Zone was devoted to security checks of headquarters, and supply and communications installations, and the screening of civilians for employment.²⁶

27. Operations in the United Kingdom.²⁷ Operations in the United Kingdom were primarily concerned with internal security, security education of troops, security of classified information and material, surveys of installations vulnerable to attack by enemy agents, investigation of personnel, and security of ports. The largest single security undertaking in the United Kingdom was protection of the mounting of the invasion, when the following steps were taken:

- a. Inspecting camps and installations and advising commanding officers of flaws in perimeter guard systems.
- b. Screening, through cooperation with British authorities, all civilians living near or having access to camps and installations.
- c. Patrolling all public places frequented by military personnel in order to detect violations of security through loose talk.
- d. Observation of briefed military personnel to insure that they did not talk to civilians or other troops.
- e. Investigation of complaints, violations, and irregularities which arose in connection with security.

28. Operations in Communications Zone after D-Day.²⁸ Headquarters, Communications Zone maintained only general supervision of counter-intelligence operations within its area of responsibility. The Communications Zone was divided into two advance sections and a varying number of base sections each of which was provided with a detachment of the Counter Intelligence Corps. When an army displaced forward Counter Intelligence Corps detachments from the advance sections took over the counter-intelligence responsibilities of that area vacated by the army. In order to effect a smooth transaction of counter-intelligence responsibility from the army to the advance section, Counter Intelligence Corps detachments from the advance section often operated for a short period with the army Counter Intelligence Corps detachments before the army displaced forward. In the early stages of operations, most detachments were assigned to the advanced sections before reverting to base section control as the advanced sections moved forward. The basic plan was to maintain a dense counter-intelligence screen in the forward area of Communications Zone, with a thinning out to the rear. The base section detachment remained as a static force until it was determined that counter-intelligence coverage of the area was no longer required, or that it could be turned over to the local civil and military authorities. Port security was the responsibility of the Counter Intelligence Corps detachments of the base sections except, in the initial period in Normandy, when the Advanced Section, Communications Zone, assumed this function.

29. There were no great differences between Counter Intelligence Corps operations in the Communications Zone, and Counter Intelligence Corps operations elsewhere. However, responsibilities were greater in countries where the attitudes of the population presented new problems. Travel control restrictions laid down by forward elements were continued until such time as the situation permitted their enforcement to be turned over to local authorities. A special task was the setting up of border controls along frontiers.²⁹ An extension of Counter Intelligence Corps activity was the gathering of political intelligence of the countries in which the troops were operating. This was done by exploiting informants, monitoring radio broadcasts, mingling with the local populations, and analyzing newspapers. Extensive assistance was also given to Civil Affairs (Military Government) in reinstating public officials.

SECTION 5

OPERATIONS WITH THE AIR FORCES

30. Mission. Since the Air Forces had no responsibility for territory other than the area occupied by their own installations and the immediate vicinity, the Counter Intelligence Corps serving with the Air Forces was concerned, almost exclusively, with protecting the security of such installations and the immediate vicinity, and was little concerned with civil security.³⁰

31. Operations in the United Kingdom. The number of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel assigned for duty with the Air Forces in the United Kingdom was not great enough to permit placing even one agent with each major Air Forces unit. The territory in which Air Force installations were situated was, therefore, divided arbitrarily into districts, and a small Counter Intelligence Corps team was assigned to each district to serve all the installations located in it. Teams contacted counter-intelligence officers of each Air Force unit and at their request made security surveys of air fields and other installations and undertook investigations of civil personnel employed by the Air Forces. Contacts were made also with other counter-intelligence agencies operating in the same area and with the British police. Much time was spent in investigations of civilian employees and of military personnel assigned to work with cryptographic devices and classified information.

32. Operations on the Continent. The same deployment of personnel as in the United Kingdom was practiced on the Continent. The commanding officer and a few assistants maintained the headquarters of the detachment in conjunction with the headquarters of the Air Force unit to which they were attached. When the construction of an emergency air field was begun, Counter Intelligence Corps agents made a security survey of the area and prepared plans for the guarding of the field and the control of the civilian population in the immediate vicinity. In connection with civil security, a special task in the Air Forces was the control of air travel, particularly by civilians

33. Shortage of Personnel. The commanders of detachments serving with the Air Forces felt that there was a constant shortage of personnel and a constant thinning out of counter-intelligence coverage. Authorization for an increase in personnel was obtained, but the demand for agents exceeded the supply. An attempt to procure personnel, especially German-speaking, from the Air Forces was unsuccessful.

SECTION 6

CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS AND OTHER MILITARY AGENCIES

34. Civil Affairs/Military Government. Mutual interest in the control of the civilian population, with a certain over-lapping of responsibilities, made the co-ordination between the Counter Intelligence Corps and Civil Affairs/Military Government extremely important. This was especially true in the field of public safety. Directives on the same subjects from higher headquarters to the two agencies were frequently in conflict. Shortage of personnel in both branches at various times resulted in Counter Intelligence Corps performing Military Government functions and vice-versa. At times, Military Government operations were hampered by the arrest and detention of civil officials by the Counter Intelligence Corps without proper co-ordination with the local Military Government detachment. Difficulty was found in conflicting policies relative to the handling of documents and archives. Military Government was required to prevent any dislocation of documents, whereas the Counter Intelligence Corps was required to exploit documents, and found it operationally impracticable to conform to Military Government requirements. In general, most problems were worked out on the ground by the local detachment personnel of the two agencies, each conceding something to the requirements of the other in order to achieve a reasonable compromise.³¹

35. War Crimes Branch, Judge Advocate Section. The responsibility for the arrest and investigation of war criminals was vested, not in G-2, but in G-1, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, United States Army.³² A special prosecuting agency was set up, known as War Crimes Branch, Judge Advocate Section. This branch, in cooperation with G-1, European Theater of Operations, prepared lists of persons wanted as war criminals and distributed these lists to the Counter Intelligence Corps for its guidance. The Counter Intelligence Corps operated in this matter under a directive which specifically prescribed that it should not occupy itself with war criminals as such, but only with those who were at the same time counter-intelligence or security suspects.³³ There was a great deal of over lapping in the two categories, but when the Counter Intelligence Corps arrested an individual as a security suspect, the investigation was conducted from that point of view regardless of the fact that the individual might also be listed as a war criminal. The Counter Intelligence Corps was not required to make the investigation as to possible war crimes, though it was instructed to prepare any evidence that it might find for transmission to the commanding officer having jurisdiction in the area. The Judge Advocate

section has indicated dissatisfaction with the handling of the war crimes investigations by the Counter Intelligence Corps stating that they found many individuals imprisoned by the Counter Intelligence Corps for security reasons, and left in detention for investigation as war criminals. Representatives of the Judge Advocate Section were often disappointed in finding a mere arrest report relating to the suspect rather than the results of a complete investigation that might be made the basis of a prosecution.

36. Military Police. Cooperation and co-ordination between Counter Intelligence Corps and Provost Marshal personnel were generally satisfactory. Each informed the other of matters within their respective jurisdictions which were revealed in the course of investigations. Sometimes there was delay between the uncovering of information by Counter Intelligence Corps and transmission to the Provost Marshal but, in general, the two agencies maintained excellent working arrangements with each other. Their problems and conflicts were usually solved by local agreement.

37. Office of Strategic Services and Special Counter Intelligence. Co-ordination between the agencies of the Office of Strategic Services and the Counter Intelligence Corps was normally accomplished by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 at the various levels of command. Liaison personnel of Special Counter Intelligence were assigned to army and higher headquarters and to sections of the Communications Zone under the jurisdiction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. In operations, personnel of Special Counter Intelligence and of the Counter Intelligence Corps were in direct contact for the exchange of information. Office of Strategic Services made available to the Counter Intelligence Corps its extremely efficient communications network for the rapid transmission of important classified information.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SECTION 7

CONCLUSIONS

The Theater General Board concludes:

1. That the Counter Intelligence Corps filled the requirement for an organized operational group to provide counter-intelligence coverage and internal security for American troops in the European Theater of Operations.
2. That there was, throughout the war, misunderstanding both on the part of Counter Intelligence Corps and of other personnel, as to the mission and method of operation of the Counter Intelligence Corps.
3. That the Table of Organization and Equipment 30-500 was adequate but should be revised as indicated in Appendix 2.
4. That the system of assigning all Counter Intelligence Corps personnel to the theater headquarters and attaching Counter Intelligence Corps detachments to major tactical commands for operations provided a flexible means of deployment and a satisfactory method of operation.
5. That the selection policies of the Counter Intelligence Corps resulted in securing exceptionally high-quality individuals, but that these policies did not provide an adequate number of linguists fluent in the languages required for operation in the European Theater of Operations.
6. That the training of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel was not entirely satisfactory.
7. That the methods of investigation and apprehension as finally evolved and the counter-sabotage and counter-espionage techniques employed by the Counter Intelligence Corps were excellent.
8. That the Counter Intelligence Corps was hampered in its operations in the Communications Zone by each detachment being limited to an area under jurisdiction of the base section to which it was attached, and that it could have operated more successfully if counter-intelligence coverage had been organized on a territorial basis under the direct operational control of the Communications Zone G-2 rather than by the attachment of the Counter Intelligence Corps units to advance and base sections.
9. That co-ordination among the Counter Intelligence Corps, Military Government, Military Police, and the War Crimes Branch of the Judge Advocate Section was hampered by conflicting interpretations of directives and by a lack of understanding of separate responsibilities and problems in fields of mutual interest.

SECTION 8

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Theater General Board recommends:

1. That the Counter Intelligence Corps remain under the operational control of the intelligence service of the theater of operations.
2. That a small Counter Intelligence Corps detachment be attached

to the G-2 sections of divisions, corps, armies, and army groups at all times.

3. That the Counter Intelligence Corps in the Communications Zone operate under the centralized control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of the Communications Zone irrespective of advanced or base section territorial jurisdiction.
4. That high qualification standards for the procurement of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel be maintained, and that greater emphasis be placed on the procurement of a greater number of qualified linguists.
5. That proper training manuals be prepared setting forth the mission and method of operation of the Counter Intelligence Corps.
6. That no person be assigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps until he has satisfactorily completed a prescribed course of basic military training.
7. That the specialist training of the Counter Intelligence Corps point toward developing investigative techniques in all personnel and concentrating upon making experts in the use of technical investigative equipment of only a limited number of men who may be retained at a high echelon as technical specialists.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Ltr, AG 320.2 (12 Dec 41) MR-M-B, 13 Dec 41, Sub: "Redesignation of the Corps of Intelligence Police".
2. Hq, ETOUSA, 29 Sep 42, SO 109, Par 8; "The Counter Intelligence Corps in the ETO", prepared under the direction of the Counter Intelligence Branch, G-2 Section, Hq, ETOUSA, and transmitted to the AG of S, G-2, ETOUSA, 8 Jun 45; Hq, Special Troops, ETOUSA, GO No. 3, 17 Aug 43, file 383.6, G-2, ETOUSA; Hq, Special Troops, ETOUSA, GO No. 4, 6 Sep 43, file 383.16, G-2, ETOUSA; see draft of "History of the Military Intelligence Service, European Theater of Operations", compiled by the Historical Section, Military Intelligence Service, no date, Chap 4, Par 3 g. WD ltr, 14 Mar 44, Sub: "Changing Assignment of CIC Personnel".
3. Ltr, Hq, CIC, ETOUSA, 13 Nov 43, Sub: "Suggested T/O for CIC, ETOUSA".
4. Adapted from T/O & E 30-500, 24 Jan 44.
5. Ltr, Hq, ETOUSA, 10 Jun 44, AG 200.3 OpGB, Sub: "CIC Personnel Requirements through 1 Jan 45", Par 4. A sketch of the schematic structure of CIC Detachments was furnished by the Personnel Officer, Hq, CIC, ETOUSA, in Oct, 45.
6. Ltr, Hq, ETOUSA, 9 Dec 44, AG 322 OpGB, Sub: "German Occupation Mission"; Cable, TUX, TAGED to CG, ETOUSA, 14 Apr 45.
7. Hq, ETOUSA, 25 Apr 45, AG 322 OpGB, Activation Order No. 276.
8. The correspondence relating to the need of foreign language specialists is summarized in Memo, Lt Col H E Wilson, Chief, CIC, ETOUSA, to AG of S, G-2, ETOUSA, 24 Jan 45, Sub: "German Linguists in CIC".
9. Ltr, Hq, ETOUSA, 30 Nov 44, AG 200.3 RCGA, Sub: "Enlisted Personnel for CIC Detachments".
10. WD Cir No. 379, 19 Sep 44.
11. Routing Slip, Hq, ETOUSA, 19 Mar 45, Sub: "CIC Personnel for Occupation of Conquered German Territory", file 301, vol 2, Hq, CIC, ETOUSA.
12. Ltr, 12 Army Group, 6 May 45, G-2 file 210.1, Sub: "Commissioning of Counter Intelligence Corps Agents as 2d Lieutenants, Counter Intelligence Corps".
13. Ltr, AG (10 Aug 44) OB-S-B-M, 12 Aug 44, Sub: "Issuance of Credentials and Badges to CIC Personnel"; Ltr, Hq, Com Z, 21 Oct 44, Sub: "CI Directive, Part III, Com Z G-2 Operations Plan, Annex B, being Annex 4 of European Theater of Operations, Counter Intelligence Corps, Administrative Standing Operating Procedure," Dec 2.
14. Ltr, Hq, ETOUSA, 2 Dec 44, AG file 322 OpGB, Sub: "Counter Intelligence Corps", Par 13.
15. Ltr, Hq, ETOUSA, 2 Dec 44, AG file 322 OpGB, Sub: "Counter Intelligence Corps", Par 10.
16. Hq, 12 Army Group, "Counter Intelligence Standing Operating Procedure", 23 Jun 44, Annex B, Par 6 (AG 350.09).

17. Ltr, Hq, ETOUSA, 2 Dec 44, AG 322 OpGB, Sub: "Counter Intelligence Corps", Par 22.
18. Ltr, Hq, ETOUSA, 2 Dec 44, AG 322 OpGB, Sub: "Counter Intelligence Corps", Par 22. See substantially the same directive in: Hq, 12 Army Group, "Counter Intelligence Directive for Germany", 10 Apr 45, Chap 8, Par 71 c (8).
19. Ltr, Hq, ETOUSA, 2 Dec 44, AG 322 OpGB, Sub: "Counter Intelligence Corps", Par 15 c.
20. Ltr, Hq, Com Z, 21 Oct 44, Sub: "Counter Intelligence Directive", Part III, Com Z, G-2 Operations Plan, Annex B being Annex 4 of "European Theater of Operations, Counter Intelligence Corps, Administrative Standing Operating Procedure", Sec 3.
21. WD Memo W 350-44, 12 Jun 44, Sub: "Counter Intelligence Corps Training Program".
22. This information is based upon "The Counter Intelligence Corps in the ETO", prepared under the direction of the Counter Intelligence Branch, G-2 Section, Hq, ETOUSA, and transmitted to the AC of S, G-2, ETOUSA, 8 Jun 45.
23. Ltr, WD, 13 Nov 44, AG 322 CIC (31 Oct 44) B-S-B-M, Sub: "Counter Intelligence Corps", Par 25. Usage as to underlining and other matters, which differs from that followed elsewhere in this report, is from the original.
24. Hq, 12 Army Group, "Counter Intelligence Directive for Germany", 10 Apr 45, Chap 8, Par 71 c.
25. The information in this section is based on replies received to questionnaires sent to selected commanding officers of Counter Intelligence Corps detachments by the Theater General Board, European Theater of Operations, and from replies to a ltr, AG, USFET, 17 May 45, to AC's of S, G-2, of armies, corps, and divisions, Sub: "Counter Intelligence Corps".
26. This information is based on replies received to a questionnaire sent to Commanding General (Attn: AC of S, G-2) of each unit named by the Theater General Board, European Theater of Operations.
27. This section is based upon "The Counter Intelligence Corps in the ETO", prepared under the direction of the Counter Intelligence Branch, G-2 Section, Hq, ETOUSA, and transmitted to the AC of S, G-2, ETOUSA, 8 Jun 45.
28. The balance of this section is based on a study by CIB, G-2, TSFET, 20 Aug 45, Sub: "CI Operations in the Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations".
29. Ltr, Hq, 12 Army Group, 28 Oct 44, AG 350.09 (G-2), Sub: "Counter Intelligence Control Line"; Ltr, Hq, 12 Army Group, 19 Jun 45, AG 381, Sub: "Frontier Control in the 15th Army Area".
30. This section is based upon interviews with, and memorandum dated 19 Nov 45, prepared by Maj. Leon L. Lemet, Commanding Officer, 702 CIC Det, Hq, US Air Forces in Europe; replies to questionnaire by CO, 608 CIC Det, 9 US Air Force, and AC of S, A-2, 9 US Air Force; and memo, dated 1 Dec 45, prepared by the AC of S, A-2, Hq, US Air Forces in Europe.

31. This section is based principally upon 1st Ind by Brig Gen C. E. Ryan, AG of S, G-2, to ltr, The General Board, USFET, 20 Oct 45, Sub: "G-5 Assistance--Committee 83 (Counter Intelligence)".
32. SHAEF, 16 Jan 45, AG 000.5-2 GAP-AGM, Sub: "Eclipse" Memo No. 18.
33. Hq, 12 Army Group, "Counter Intelligence Directive for Germany", 10 Apr 45, Chap 6, Par 50 c.

COMPOSITION OF 970 COUNTER INTELLIGENCECORPS DETACHMENT

<u>Units</u>	<u>Type Team</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
1	A-1	1	1
7	A-2	7	21
1	A-3	2	4
5	A-4	20	30
4	B-2	8	32
83	B-3	249	913
9	B-4	36	99
	Total	323	1,100

Appendix 1.

ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT REQUESTED FROM THE FIELD

ITEM	NO OF DETACHMENTS REQUESTING
Generator, electric, small	7
Telephones, field	2
Radio, two-way, portable	4
Cooker, 20-man size	6
Stove, Coleman	2
Mess set, officers'	1
Typewriters, portable (in lieu of standard size)	2
Parachute equipment	1 (13 Airborne Division)
Car, armored, M-8	1 (4 Armored Division)
Truck, 3/4 ton	7
Truck, 1½ ton	2
Truck, 2½ ton	1

Appendix 2.

THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
APO 408

R 320.2/31 TGBDB

SUBJECT: Counter Intelligence Corps Organization and Operations.

TO :

1. The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, is engaged in a study of the organization and operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the European Theater of Operations.
2. Because monthly CIC operational reports do not adequately cover all of the questions now being considered by The General Board, the attached questionnaire has been prepared in order to obtain your opinions on this subject for consideration in the development of the over-all theater study.
3. It is requested that you complete the attached questionnaire and return it to this headquarters at the earliest practicable date.

FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD:

/s/ L. R. Garrison,
/t/ L. R. GARRISON,
Colonel, AGD,
Secretary.

1 Incl, as above.

APPENDIX 3

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS QUESTIONNAIRE

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

1. Was the T/O of your CIC Detachment adequate in all respects? Discuss fully any recommended changes.
2. a. How were you administered and serviced?
 - (1) By attachment to Hq Command?
 - (2) By attachment to another unit?
 - (3) By MIS
 - (4) Independently?
- b. What suggestions can you offer to improve administration of CIC in the field?
3. How did you accomplish replacement of personnel?
4. How did you procure linguists?
5. What is your opinion as to the advisability of having CIC as T/O personnel of the unit instead of on an attached basis?
6. What is your opinion as to the adequacy of the size of your detachment for accomplishment of its mission?
7. Do you consider that self administration would be more efficient and practical than administration by another unit?

EQUIPMENT

1. a. Was the T/E adequate?
- b. What equipment did you find to be excess?
- c. What equipment did you require in addition to T/E?
2. What problems did you have with reference to supply and servicing of equipment - all types - and how did you meet them?

TRAINING

1. Where were the majority of the men of your detachment trained?
 - a. Chicago School ()
 - b. Service Command Schools ()
 - c. Cp Ritchie (full Course) ()
 - d. Holabird CIC School ()
 - e. Unit Schools ()
2. Which of the above provided the best training for the mission in the ETO?
3. What additional training would have been desirable?
4. Did you establish, or have access to a unit training school before leaving the US or in the UK? After arriving on the continent?
5. Did you attempt language instruction? With what degree of success?

OPERATIONS

1. What were the major missions on which you employed your CIC and what percentage (approximate) of their work did each comprise?

<u>Mission</u>	<u>% of Total Duties</u>		
	<u>Prior to D-Day</u>	<u>In Liber- ated Coun- tries</u>	<u>Ger- many</u>
a. Security checks of Hq and vital installations.			
b. CI instruction of military personnel.			
c. Travel control of civilians.			
d. Screening of civilians for employment.			
e. Intelligence screening of PWs.			
f. Investigation of espionage suspects.			
g. Investigation of suspected cases of sabotage.			
h. Seizure of intelligence targets.			
i. Investigation of military personnel for cryptographic duty, Top Secret document handling, commission, etc.			
j. Procuring political intelligence.			
k. Escort duty with ranking officers.			
l. Investigation and apprehension of automatic arrest and "wanted" personnel in Germany			
m. Investigation and apprehension of War Criminals.			

2. a. Into what size units did you divide your detachment for operations?

b. What advantages and disadvantages, both operational and administrative did this division develop?

3. How did you employ your linguistic personnel to secure maximum utility?

4. How did you overcome loss of personnel economy presented by use of CIC investigators on housekeeping duties such as?

a. The necessity for leaving a driver with vehicles.

b. Inter-detachment courier system.

c. Transportation of suspect persons great distances to interrogation centers.

d. What recommendations can you make to increase economy in employment of CIC personnel?

5. a. Were CIC channels used for communication between your detachment and CIC of adjoining units or were all communications routed through the G-2 Section?
- b. What is your opinion on the use of CIC channels during the progress of an investigation and for exchange of information of exclusive CIC interest?
6. What suggestions can you offer to increase efficiency of operation of CIC Detachments?
7. Did you receive adequate information to aid you in investigations? From what sources? Was it in sufficient detail? How could it have been improved?
8. Was your detachment compelled, in other than emergency circumstances, to perform other than CIC missions as outlined in WD directive?
9. What is your opinion of the wearing of officer or civilian type uniforms by CIC personnel?
10. Do you believe that satisfactory results would be obtained by considering the CIC agents as "enlisted men"?
11. Would you recommend that CIC agents be given Warrant Officer status?

COORDINATION BETWEEN COUNTER INTELLIGENCE COMPS

AND OTHER AGENCIES

1. How well coordinated was the work of your detachment with:
 - a. CIC.
 - b. MG - Civil Affairs Detachments.
 - c. OSS.
 - d. Allied CI agencies.
 - e. Indigenous authorities.
 - f. Others.
2. What conflicts arose between MG mission and CI missions and how were they overcome?

MISCELLANEOUS

If the foregoing questions did not permit you to answer or discuss all the problems as fully as you desired, please add all your comments here.

THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
APO 408

SUBJECT: Counter Intelligence Corps Organization and Operations.

TO :

1. The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, is engaged in a study to evaluate the Counter Intelligence Corps during its operations in the European Theater of Operations.

2. Because adequate appreciation of the operational and administrative functioning of the Counter Intelligence Corps must reflect the opinions of all echelons with which Counter Intelligence Corps operated in the European Theater of Operations, the attached questionnaire has been prepared in order to obtain your opinions on this subject for consideration in the development of the overall theater study.

3. It is requested that the attached questionnaire be completed and returned to this headquarters at the earliest practicable date.

FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL BOARD:

/s/ L. R. Garrison,
/t/ L. R. GARRISON,
Colonel, AGD,
Secretary.

Appendix 4.

ORGANIZATION

1. What was the size of your CIC Detachment prior to "D" Day?
2. Was it subsequently increased and if so during what period and under what circumstances was this increase made?
3. What size CIC Detachment do you consider the best suited for your unit?
4. What comments have you on the administrative organization of CIC as applied to your unit?
5. How did you secure replacements or additional CIC personnel? What difficulties did you encounter?
6. As a staff section, were you adequately prepared to assume the command responsibilities imposed by assignment and attachment of CIC and the other MIS specialist teams? How did you handle this command responsibility?
7. If MIS specialist personnel were administered and serviced by Headquarters Command, was the Headquarters Command large enough or sufficiently well equipped to absorb this additional personnel? Should Headquarters Command be augmented to meet these attachments?
8. Do you believe CIC (as well as other MI specialist personnel) should be assigned, or attached to units? Why?
9. What is your reaction to assigning or attaching CIC to MP for administration?

EQUIPMENT

1. What additional equipment should be included in T/E for CIC?
2. What equipment proved unnecessary?

TRAINING

1. In what respects were CIC personnel assigned to your unit not adequately trained when they joined your organization?
2. Did you institute a unit training program for CIC and if so, what did it cover?
3. What additional training should CIC have before being assigned to units?

EMPLOYMENT

1. How was CIC personnel distributed to accomplish mission?
2. How did you meet the problem posed by a lack of linguistic ability on part of CIC personnel?
3. What sources of information were open to CIC to aid them in their mission?
4. How did you overcome loss of personnel economy presented by use of CIC investigators on housekeeping duties; the necessity for leaving a driver with vehicles; inter-detachment courier system; and transportation of suspect persons great distances to interrogation centers?

What recommendations can you make to increase economy in employment of CIC personnel?

5. What status did you give CIC officer on duty with you? Did he function as a part of the G-2 Section or merely as CO of the detachment?

6. Were CIC channels used for communication between your detachment and CIC of adjoining units or were all communications routed through the G-2 Section? What is your opinion on the use of CIC channels during progress of an investigation and for exchange of information of exclusive CIC interest?

7. What were the major missions on which you employed your CIC and what percentage (approximate) of their work did each comprise?

Mission	% of Total Duties		
	Prior to D-Day	In Liberated Countries	Germany
a. Security checks of Hq and vital installations			
b. CI instruction of military personnel			
c. Travel control of civilians			
d. Screening of civilians for employment			
e. Intelligence screening of FW's			
f. Investigation of espionage suspects.			
g. Investigation of suspected cases of sabotage			
h. Seizure of intelligence targets			
i. Investigation of military personnel for cryptographic duty, Top Secret document handling, commission, etc.			
j. Procuring political intelligence			
k. Escort duty with ranking officers			
l. Investigation and apprehension of automatic arrest and "wanted" personnel in Germany			
m. Investigation and apprehension of War Criminals			

COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES

1. Was coordination with following listed agencies accomplished by your office or by direct contact with CIC?

- a. CID
- b. MG - Civil Affairs Det's
- c. OSS
- d. British Field Security Sections
- e. French DS Doc (CIC)
- f. Indigenous authorities
- g. JA (War Crimes)
- h. Others

CIC	G-2

2. What is your opinion as to the effectiveness of this coordination as judged by the standards of prompt exchange of information and

assistance?

3. What suggestions can you offer to improve coordination between these agencies and CIC?

4. What conflicts were encountered between MG (Civil Affairs) mission and the CIC mission and how were they overcome?

5. What was the relationship between MG Special Branch and CIC?

- a. Was there a defined delimitation of authority?
- b. Was there a duplication of effort?
- c. Were records and information exchanged?

MISCELLANEOUS

1. What is your opinion on the CIC wearing distinctive type uniform to increase prestige and facilitate operation where knowledge of their enlisted rank might be a handicap?

2. Do you consider an organization like the CIC necessary or could same results have been accomplished through use of non-specialist personnel?

3. What is your chief criticism of the CIC?

4. What is your reaction to a combining of CIC, IFV, MII, PI, and other intelligence specialist units into a MI Specialist Detachment to be assigned to the Hq's for use of the G-2 and including its own administrative and service personnel.

5. What was the attitude of other troops toward special liberties enjoyed by CIC?

6. Do you believe CIC could have functioned along strictly military lines or do you believe that the semi-civilian status is necessary?

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

322 (G-2)

17 May 1945

SUBJECT: Counter Intelligence Corps.

TO : Commanders Concerned.

1. Each Army, Corps and Division headquarters in the European Theater of Operations has had a Counter Intelligence Corps attached to it during the Western European campaigns.

2. It is desired at this time to evaluate the work of the Counter Intelligence Corps and determine the contribution it has made and can make in the future in combat operations such as those which have recently been concluded.

3. It is requested therefore that your comments, criticisms and suggestions for the improvement of the Corps and its methods of operation, as well as an appraisal of the worth of your CIC Detachment during field operations of your unit, be forwarded to this headquarters through channels on or before 10 June 1945.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL BRADLEY:

/s/ J. H. Bloss,
/t/ J. H. BLOSS,
Lt Col, AGD,
Asst Adj Gen.

DISTRIBUTION:

To each Army, Corps and Division.

APPENDIX 5